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<Abstract>  
 Since 2003, the Financial Services Agency has set relationship banking enhancement program as 
an important strategic task to improve the functions of regional financial institutions. In this 
enhancement program, the FSA recommended that regional financial institutions introduce new 
financial products such as collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and collateralized bond obligations 
(CBOs). However, this was left up to each institution’s discretion rather than being mandatory. This 
resulted in a large difference in the introduction of new products. Therefore, this paper has analyzed 
what kinds of credit associations favorably increased the use of new financial products. As a result, it 
has been confirmed that the larger their lending shares and management scale, and the better their 
business conditions are, the more positively they work on the introduction of new products. 
Considering the fact that relationships between financial institutions and enterprises tend to be fixed 
in Japan, this means that medium and small enterprises will have restrictions on the financial 
products they can use depending on the situation of their main banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 2003, the Financial Services Agency （FSA） has promoted feature enhancements of 
relationship banking, targeting regional financial institutions. This was done to improve the 
profitability of regional financial institutions as they have suffered from bad loans. The program 
covered a wide area, but one of the most important aspects was to help regional financial institutions 
become familiar with new financial products and offer them to medium-to-small enterprises that 
required these products. More specifically, these products included start-up support funding products, 
funding with a scoring model, funding with a syndicated loan, and securitization products (including 
CLOs and CBOs). 
However, it was left to each institution's discretion to deal with these new products, so the effort 
put forth in the four years since March 2003 varies greatly. The purpose of this paper is to analyze 
what factors caused such a difference. In Japan, there are two different kinds of regional financial 
institutions, banks and credit associations (Shinkin Bank in Japanese), and they have organizational 
differences as banks are stock companies and credit associations are cooperative financial 
institutions. In addition, generally speaking, banks are larger in size than credit associations. Most 
banks have been introducing new financial products before the commencement of the relationship 
banking feature enhancement program by the FSA. For this reason, it would be more interesting to 
study smaller credit associations to find out the cause of the variation. Therefore, this paper focuses 
on how credit associations introduced new financial products1. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 summarizes the situation of how credit 
associations introduced new financial products between 2003 and 2007; Section 3 explains the data 
used in the analysis; Section 4 reports the results; and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. The Disclosure Situation of the Relationship Banking Results 
In the relationship banking feature enhancement program introduced by the FSA, (1) start-up 
                                                  
1 Based on questionnaire-type research by the U.S. Federal Reserve, Mach and Wolken (2006) 
analyzed the level of usage of financial products by medium to small enterprises in the United States. 
However, analysis for detailed categorization of loan products has not been performed. 
Yamori(2009) analyzed the utilization of Japanese small businesses based on his own questioner 
result.  
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support funding, (2) credit scoring loans, (3) syndicated loans, and (4) CLOs (collateralized loan 
obligations) were listed as essential features. Thus, we decided to analyze these four new financial 
products. The situation of features introduction in the industry as a whole is shown in Table 1. 
Unfortunately, there is no database that discloses individual financial institution’s figures together, 
so we searched the Web sites of all 287 credit associations that existed as of the end of March 2007 
when the four-year feature enhancement program concluded to find relevant figures. As a result, we 
were not able to find relevant data for 107 credit associations (about 40%) on their Web sites. 
It is unlikely that had they actually completed the recommendation by the FSA they did not 
disclose the data, so we safely assumed that the credit associations that did not disclosed any data 
had not taken up such project2. Thus, we can interpret the disclosure as a proxy variable for whether 
they have participated in this project or not. 
However, even among credit associations that have disclosed the data, there are those that only 
disclosed either one of the number of items or the amount of money, and those that disclosed both. 
Taking the possibility that there is a difference between them, we will consider two patterns in the 
following analysis. Firstly, credit associations in which the number of items and amount of money 
are both disclosed are considered as “working on the project,” and credit associations in which 
nothing is disclosed are considered as “not working on the project.” This is Case 1. Credit 
associations that disclosed either one of the items and the amount of money are excluded 
intentionally from the Case 1 analysis. Next, in Case 2, if a credit association disclosed at least one 
of the number of items or amount of money, it is regarded as “working on the project,” and those 
that did not disclose anything is regarded as “not working on the project.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
2 Spiegel and Yamori (2006) analyzed optional disclosure of bad debt of credit associations and it 
was discovered that disadvantageous information tends not to be disclosed. 
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Table 1. Relational banking action program of credit associations (number of cases) 
  2003–2004 2005–2006 Total 
Funding using start-up support funding products 2,667 5,865 8,532
Funding using scoring model products 73,041 110,632 183,673
Participating syndicated loan   776 1,645 2,421
Debt liquidation, securitization (including CLOs and 
CBOs)  
738 2,209 2,947
(Source: “Credit association participation through old and new action program period” [released on 
July 12, 2007], The National Association of Shinkin Banks) 
 
 
3. Method of Analysis 
 This paper verifies the attitude of the credit associations towards new financial products using 
logit model analysis. More specifically, logit analysis is performed on each of the four main items 
above to verify the factors that caused differences in attitudes towards new financial products. 
 As possible factors, this paper considers the following variables. First, the bad loan ratio change 
(BLRCHG) will be adopted as an indicator reflecting the health of the institution. The value derived 
by subtracting the value in 2003 from the value in 2006 is used as the change. It is possible that the 
better their health, the more they can afford to initiate something new, but it is also possible that the 
better the health, the more conservative they become and more negative about trying something new. 
As an indicator reflecting profitability, the change in interest rate on loans (IRLCHG) has been 
adopted, and the value derived by subtracting the value in 2003 from the value in 2006 is used as 
well. Note that the interest rate on loans is calculated by dividing the interest on loans and discounts 
with the outstanding balance. If certain management vitality is required to deal with new financial 
products, it can be assumed that credit associations with improving profitability are more willing to 
introduce such products. On the other hand, it can also be said that if high profitability has already 
been achieved with conventional products, they will have little incentive to introduce new products. 
Next, the overhead cost rate (OHCR) is adopted as an indicator that reflects influences on costs 
associated with introducing new financial products. Note that the overhead cost rate is defined by 
dividing the operating cost with ordinary revenue. Participating in a syndicated loan is not so costly, 
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although the profitability is low. The higher the overhead costs a financial institution has, the more 
attractive these new low-cost financial products will be. Thus, it is possible that credit associations 
with high overhead costs are favorable to introducing some kinds of new financial products. 
In addition, the market share of lending per prefecture (MSLPP) will be adopted as an indicator 
that reflects differences in each competitive environment. The higher the share they have in the 
lending market, the more difficult it is to improve their share with existing products, so they need to 
use new products3. On the other hand, credit associations with a low share might have a stronger 
motive in taking customers from other financial institutions using new products. Credit associations 
have a geographically-limited business infrastructure compared to regional banks, so it is fair to 
define their degree of competition based on prefectures. 
Finally, their size might affect their attitude toward introduction. Here, a logarithm of total assets 
(LAST) is adopted. If the introduction of new financial products is associated with large fixed costs, 
the economies of scale will become important, so larger credit associations will be more favorable. 
On the other hand, the larger the organization is, the less flexible it will be, so they might be negative 
to new introduction. 
Apart from two variables measuring changes, the values are all as of the end of FY 2006 (i.e., 
March 31, 2007). The financial data of credit associations is taken from the “National Credit 
Association Financial Statements” by Kin-yu Tosho Consultant Corporation. The outstanding 
balances of loaned money per prefecture used to calculate lending market share are taken from 
“Finance Map 2007” (Monthly Finance Journal’s Special Issue) by Nikkin Co. 
 
 
4. Results of the Analysis 
 Table 2 summarizes the analysis results of logit model regressions4. The dependent variables are 
dummy variables, with 0 set for the credit associations that have not introduced new financial 
products and 1 set for those that have. The number of the former is 103 for both Case 1 and Case 2. 
                                                  
3 Boot（2000）reports that the impact that the level of competition in loan market gives on 
relationship banking is not obvious due to other conflicting factors. 
4 Correlation coefficient between explanation variables was the highest between loaned money share 
in each prefecture (MSLPP) and logarithm of total assets (LAST) for both estimate models. However, 
including factors between other variables, all correlation coefficients were absolute values below 0.5, 
so it was concluded that there is no problem of multicollinearity. 
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 Beginning with start-up support funding, the case that targets credit associations that disclose data 
for both the number of items and amount of money (referred to as “Case 1”) has a 10% significant 
positive coefficient for the interest rate of loan change (IRLCHC). We can see that those who 
succeed in improving the interest rate of loan pricing tend to use start-up support funding. In 
addition, both with Case 1 and the Case 2, where credit associations disclose at least one of the 
number of items or amount of money, the values for market share of lending per prefecture (MSLPP) 
and the logarithm of total assets (LAST) are significantly positive. This means that credit 
associations with a high market share of lending and large management scale are willing to use 
start-up support funding. However, both cases have low determination coefficients, indicating that 
credit associations that participate in start-up support funding have diverse attributes. 
 As for syndicated loans, Case 1 has a significantly positive coefficient for the overhead cost rate 
(OHCR). This indicates that credit associations with relatively high overhead costs are eager to 
participate in syndicated loans. In addition, although they are not significant, the coefficients for the 
bad loan ratio change (BLRCHG) are negative for both cases, meaning that credit associations with 
advancing bad loan disposal tend to participate in syndicated loans. The coefficients for market share 
of lending per prefecture (MSLPP) and the logarithm of total assets (LAST) are significantly 
positive here. 
 Scoring model loan is a category that many credit associations started to deal with, but among the 
explanatory variables, only the market share of lending (MSLPP) and the logarithm of total assets 
(LAST) have significant coefficients. In addition, on the contrary to the syndicated loans, the 
coefficient for the bad loan ratio change (BLRCHG) is positive for both cases. 
 Finally, as for CLOs (collateralized loan obligations), both cases have a significant positive 
coefficients for the bad loan ratio change (BLRCHG), on the contrary to start-up support funding 
and syndicated loans. As securitization is one of the method to off-balance band loans, credit 
associations with an increasing bad loan ratio are working on off-balancing through CLO. Apart 
from this, the interest rate of loan change (IRLCHG), market share of lending per prefecture 
(MSLPP), and the logarithm of total assets (LAST) are significantly positive. Interestingly, the 
expected model for CLOs—the item with fewest credit association working on it—has the highest 
determination coefficient. CLOs is a task that requires a complicated scheme (such as a 
special-purpose company to assign loans), and has few credit associations that are working on it, so 
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those who are working on it have similar attributes, resulting in such values. 
 As discussed above, whether significant or not, the coefficients of the interest rate of loan change 
(IRLCHG) and overhead costs rate (OHCR) are positive, indicating that credit associations with 
improved interest rates of loan pricing and high overhead cost rates are likely to introduce new 
finance products. In addition, coefficients for the market share of lending (MSLPP) and logarithm of 
total assets (LAST) are significantly positive, revealing that credit associations with stronger market 
power and larger management scale are favorable to introducing new financial products5. 
 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper analyzed differences in attitudes of financial institutions towards new financial 
products. Credit associations with improved pricing for interest rates of lending and high overhead 
cost rates are more likely to introduce new financial products. In addition, those with larger market 
power and management scale are also positive toward introducing new products.  
 In Japan, the relationship between enterprises and financial associations tend to be fixed. This 
means that enterprises will not actually be able to use new financial products unless the financial 
institutions they work with are willing to provide. The smaller the enterprise scale is, the more they 
tend to deal with smaller or weaker financial institutions, which are likely to provide less new 
financial products. Therefore, it can be said that smaller companies are deprived of opportunities to 
use new financial products. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
5 Multinominal logit regression was also performed to verify the differences among characteristics 
in each item; however, due to factors such as extreme reduction in the number of samples, we could 
not achieve satisfactory analysis result. 
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 Table 2. Introducing new financial products (logit regression)           
              
   Start-Up Support Funding  Syndicated Loans 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 
   Coefficient  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient  
Standard 
error 
 Constant term -6.4776 ** 2.8600 -6.3930 ** 2.6498 -17.4481 *** 4.2312 -15.5407 *** 3.7578 
 BLRCHG -0.0076  0.0562 0.0048  0.0537 -0.0105  0.0739 -0.0102  0.0656 
 IRLCHG 1.2394 * 0.0718 1.0498  0.0672 0.8373  0.0918 1.0844  0.0849 
 OHCR 1.1064  1.9936 0.9927  1.8623 4.9208 * 2.7526 3.5130  2.3794 
 MSLPP 14.6301 * 8.4594 15.9503 * 8.2299 17.7206 * 9.2937 18.9041 ** 8.8389 
 LAST 0.4429 ** 0.1855 0.4630 *** 0.1739 1.0661 *** 0.2623 1.0170 *** 0.2385 
              
 Scaled R-squared  0.0934  0.0914  0.2259  0.2347  
 Log likelihood -127.709 -145.859 -78.946  -101.019 
              
 Number of samples 198 227 153 180 
 (positive values) 95 124 50 77 
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   Credit Scoring CLOs（Collateralized Loan Obligations） 
  Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 
   Coefficient  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient  
Standard 
error 
 Constant term -10.7215 *** 3.6418 -11.5676 *** 3.6099 -27.1881 *** 5.9907 -29.0228 *** 5.6725 
 BLRCHG 0.0410  0.0658 0.0379  0.0643 0.1929 * 0.1109 0.1968 * 0.1027 
 IRLCHG 0.8545  0.0753 0.9899  0.0749 1.5621  0.1102 1.7067  0.1076 
 OHCR 2.6155  2.3156 2.5657  2.2951 7.4706 ** 3.6406 7.8843 ** 3.3276 
 MSLPP 23.1054 ** 9.6153 23.1608 ** 9.6291 32.1546 ** 13.1317 20.9758 * 11.7407 
 LAST 0.6706 *** 0.2344 0.7453 *** 0.2317 1.6780 *** 0.3671 1.8474 *** 0.3543 
              
 Scaled R-squared  0.1584  0.1780  0.3421 0.3602  
 Log likelihood -99.390  -101.778 -49.218  -58.150  
              
 Number of samples 169 174 134 143 
 (positive values) 66 71 31 40 
(Note: ***,  **,  * indicate significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.)         
              
 
